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To advance understanding of the entrepreneurship process in developing economies, this
article evaluates whether registered enterprises that initially avoid the cost of registration,
and focus their resources on overcoming other liabilities of newness, lay a stronger foun-
dation for subsequent growth. Analyzing World Bank Enterprise Survey data across 127
countries, and controlling for other firm performance determinants, registered enterprises
that started up unregistered and spent longer operating unregistered are revealed to have
significantly higher subsequent annual sales, employment, and productivity growth rates
compared with those that registered from the outset. The theoretical and policy implica-
tions are then discussed.
Introduction
In recent years, a small but burgeoning body of entrepreneurship scholarship has
begun to focus upon entrepreneurship in the informal sector, by which is here meant
starting up and/or owning and managing a business venture which does not register with
and/or declare some or all of its production and/or sales to the authorities for tax, benefit,
and/or labor law purposes when it should do so (Ketchen, Ireland, & Webb, 2014;
Siqueira, Webb, & Bruton, 2016; Williams &Martinez-Perez, 2014). This is an important
development in entrepreneurship scholarship. With two-thirds of enterprises in the
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developing world estimated to start up unregistered (Autio & Fu, 2015), advancing com-
prehension of the reasons for, and impacts of, nonregistration is crucial if the entrepre-
neurship process in developing economies is to be more fully understood.
Conventionally, nonregistration has been viewed as deleterious to firm performance.
In the long-standing liabilities of newness approach, registration provides new ventures
with some level of legitimacy, and reduces their probability of failure (Stinchcombe,
1965). Here, however, we question the transferability of this widely accepted (developed
world) view of the reasons for, and impacts of, registration to the developing world. The
aim of this article is to analyze whether formal enterprises in developing countries that
initially avoid the cost of registration, and instead concentrate their scarce resources on
overcoming other liabilities of newness, subsequently outperform those which registered
from the outset.
By analyzing the relationship between starting up unregistered and future firm per-
formance, knowledge is advanced in three important ways. First, this article advances
theory on not only venture creation and growth in developing countries but also develops
a more contextualized understanding of liabilities of newness. Reading venture creation
and liabilities of newness in the impoverished setting of the developing world through
the lens of institutional theory, it will be asserted not only that unregistered enterprises
may lack formal legality but possess a level of social legitimacy (Godfrey, 2015; Webb,
Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009) but also that the considerable formal market imper-
fections in the developing world result in registration having limited benefits but rela-
tively substantial costs. Hence, rather than address their liabilities of newness by
investing resources in seeking legality through registration, which in many developing
economies is a significant cost but with few benefits, enterprises in the developing world
that delay registration and its associated costs, and instead focus their scarce resources
on overcoming other liabilities of newness (e.g., establishing stronger routines, relation-
ships with suppliers and customers), are propounded to lay the foundations for stronger
subsequent firm performance than those that register from the outset. The original empir-
ical contribution of this article, using World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data on
127 developing countries, is to reveal that registered enterprises that start up unregistered
and spend longer operating unregistered do indeed outperform those registering from the
outset. This is the case for econometric estimations using imputed and nonimputed data,
with and without outlying observations, and with correction for potential sample selec-
tion bias, given that registration at start up is an endogenous choice. Finally, and from a
policy perspective, we demonstrate the need for governments in developing countries
when tackling informal entrepreneurship to put less emphasis on pursuing a punitive
approach that does not deal with the causes of nonregistration, and to place more empha-
sis on the institutional conditions that significantly disadvantage enterprises registering
from the outset relative to those delaying registration, due to the costs of registration out-
weighing the benefits.
To advance understanding of the entrepreneurship process in developing countries,
therefore, the first section frames the contributions of this article by reviewing how insti-
tutional theory explains nonregistration in developing countries. This will reveal that
despite institutional scholars recognizing that unregistered enterprises often possess
social legitimacy in the developing world, and that they prevail due to formal institutional
imperfections and institutional incongruence, little attention has been given to evaluating
the impacts of starting up unregistered on subsequent firm performance. Consequently, to
develop theory and hypotheses, the second section reviews the conventional (developed
world) liabilities of newness approach that views registration as providing some level of
legality and as positively affecting firm performance, followed by the need for a
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rethinking of nonregistration in developing world contexts along with the rationales for
viewing enterprises in developing countries that initially avoid the cost of firm registra-
tion as achieving higher subsequent firm performance than those that register from the
outset. To evaluate the resultant propositions, the third section introduces the data and
methods, namely World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) harmonized data on 95,522
enterprises in 127 developing countries and multilevel modeling techniques (random con-
stant and random slope models). In the fourth section, we present the results to explore
the main impacts of starting up unregistered and the duration of nonregistration. To con-
trol for sample selection bias, we use a Heckman two-step estimator, while robustness
checks on the results are conducted by removing outliers from both ends of the distribu-
tion of suspected variables. Finding that registered enterprises that started up unregistered
and spent longer unregistered have significantly higher subsequent annual sales, employ-
ment and productivity growth rates than enterprises registered from the outset, the fifth
and final section discusses the resultant theoretical and policy advances along with the
limitations of the research and future research required.
Informal Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: An Institutional
Perspective
For much of the twentieth century, the informal sector in developing countries was
largely deemed unimportant and unworthy of scholarly attention. A modernization theory
prevailed that depicted the informal sector as some minor and declining remnant of an
earlier mode of production, and its continuing persistence in countries as signaling their
“underdevelopment” and “backwardness” (Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 1959).
The widespread belief was that such endeavor would naturally and inevitably disappear
with economic advancement and modernization. Over the past few decades however, the
informal sector has been recognized as an extensive and persistent feature of the develop-
ing world, equivalent to some 40–60% of GDP (Schneider & Williams, 2013), with 60%
of the workforce having their main employment in the informal economy (J€utting &
Laiglesia, 2009), of which 70% are self-employed (ILO, 2013). Indeed, although there is
a lack of robust comprehensive data on the number of unregistered businesses, a conser-
vative lower-bound estimate is that at least half of all enterprises are unregistered (Acs,
Desai, Stenholm, & Wuebker, 2013), and that some two-thirds of all enterprises are
unregistered at start up (Autio & Fu, 2015).
Recently, significant advances have been made in understanding the prevalence of
informal entrepreneurship in developing countries by scholars adopting an institutional
perspective. Entrepreneurship is viewed as a socially constructed behavior (Sine & David,
2010; Webb & Ireland, 2015), and institutions as “the rules of the game” which prescribe,
monitor, enforce, and support what is socially acceptable (Baumol & Blinder, 2008; Den-
zau & North 1994; Mathias, Lux, Crook, Autry, & Zaretzki, 2014; North, 1990; Webb
et al., 2009). All societies have both formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regula-
tions) that set out the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions which are the
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced
outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Informal
entrepreneurship is viewed as an endeavor occurring outside of formal institutional pre-
scriptions but within the norms, values, and beliefs of informal institutions (Godfrey,
2011; Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Bailey, 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al.; Welter,
Smallbone, & Pobol, 2015). For example, although avoiding registration laws is formally
illegal, in many developing economies registration requirements are seen as overly
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burdensome, due to the formal institutional imperfections, and their circumvention thus
deemed socially legitimate (De Soto, 1989; Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2013).
This institutional perspective, therefore, has explained informal entrepreneurship in
developing countries as resulting from either formal institutional imperfections and/or the
incongruence between formal and informal institutions. As Webb and Ireland (2015) out-
line, these formal institutional imperfections are of four types. First, there are formal insti-
tutional voids, including the lack of, or poorly defined, property rights, lack of basic
utilities, and poor social protection which forces citizens into necessity-driven informal
entrepreneurship as a survival strategy (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; Webb,
Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2010). Second, there are formal institutional inefficiencies,
or resource misallocations by formal institutions (Qian & Strahan, 2007), such as when
formal institutions seek to protect or maximize economic rents for elites (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012), manifested in overly burdensome taxes, and registration and licensing
regulations and costs, which act as an entry barrier to formality for new entrepreneurs (De
Soto, 1989; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams, Shahid, &Martinez, 2016). Third, there is for-
mal institutional uncertainty when technology and sociocultural changes outpace changes
in the ability of formal institutions to accommodate new domains of activity and fourth,
there is formal institutional weakness and instability, manifested in a lack of capacity to
enforce policies (Webb et al., 2009) and continuous changes in laws and regulations (Lev-
itsky &Murillo, 2009; Williams & Vorley, 2015).
When explaining informal entrepreneurship, however, focusing upon solely formal
institutional imperfections ignores the role played by cognitive and normative institutions,
which can be joined within the broad category of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015;
North, 1990; Scott, 2008). Indeed, informal entrepreneurship has been increasingly
viewed as arising “because of the incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by
formal and informal institutions” (Webb et al., 2009, p. 495). Given that developing econ-
omies are so defined precisely because they have under-developed formal institutions,
entrepreneurs draw upon existing norms, values, and beliefs to facilitate, govern, and
structure their economic activities instead of relying on formal codified laws and regula-
tions (London, Esper, Grogan-Kaylor, & Kistruck, 2014; Mair, Marti, & Ventresca,
2012). When these formal and informal institutions do not align, as is common in many
developing countries, the result is informal entrepreneurship which, although formally
illegal, is deemed socially legitimate (De Castro, Khavul, & Bruton, 2014; Kistruck et al.,
2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2013; Webb, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2014). Indeed,
the greater the degree of incongruence (i.e., nonalignment) between formal and informal
institutions, the higher the level of informal entrepreneurship (Williams & Shahid, 2016).
Informal entrepreneurship is therefore more extensive in developing than developed econ-
omies due to not only the greater formal institutional imperfections, but also the greater
incongruence between formal and informal institutions, resulting in the use of informal
institutions as an alternative guiding framework (Mair et al., 2012; Godfrey, 2015).
Turning to the impacts of entrepreneurs deciding to operate informally, the wide-
spread finding has been that enterprises operating under the guiding framework of the
informal institutional environment are less efficient and poorer performing than those
operating in formal institutional environments (Benjamin & Mbaye, 2012; La Porta &
Schleifer, 2008, 2014). Indeed, not only do new ventures operating legitimately show
higher levels of revenue and profits, use more workers, and are more capital intensive
than their informal counterparts (Fajnzylber, Maloney, &Montes-Rojas, 2011; McKenzie
& Sakho, 2010) but there is also evidence that registration by informal firms leads to
higher firm performance than if they remained unregistered (Demenet, Razafindrakoto, &
Roubaud, 2015; Fajnzylber et al.; Rand & Torm, 2012). What has been seldom evaluated,
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however, is whether enterprises that start up unregistered and register later, not least to
avoid the cost of registration during their start up phase, subsequently witness higher firm
performance than those registered from the outset. This empirical focus, as will now be
shown, is important because it enables new theoretical insights to be generated regarding
the longstanding liabilities of newness approach.
Starting Up Unregistered and Firm Performance
Impacts of Delaying Registration on Future Firm Performance
The concept of liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) has been a key element in
scholars’ understanding of the emergence and growth of new ventures for the past half
century. Recognizing that new ventures have higher mortality rates than older more estab-
lished ventures (Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010),
new ventures are asserted to lack a track record of past performance on which to base
claims of legitimacy, reliability, and accountability (Choi & Shepherd, 2005; Delmar &
Shane, 2004) and to be perceived as competent, effective, and worthy (Zimmerman &
Zeitz, 2002). Registering is, thus, a way of enhancing legitimacy because registering sug-
gests that a business complies with other laws and regulations, such as paying taxes and
has the appropriate licenses and certifications, and thereby generally contributes to the
overall societal good (Kistruck et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2009), signaling stability, quality,
and/or prestige (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995) and reducing liabilities of newness.
Nonregistration, conversely, is seen to lead to a lack of legitimacy which negatively
affects nascent firm performance (Fajnzylber, Maloney, & Montes Rojas, 2009; Farrell,
2004; ILO, 2007; La Porta & Schleifer, 2008; Palmer, 2007).
Ventures starting up unregistered should therefore have worse subsequent perfor-
mance levels than those registered from the outset, all other things being equal. However,
although a positive relationship has been identified between newness and mortality rates
(Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; Le Mens, Hannan, & Polos, 2011), with the exception of
Henderson (1999) who examines sales growth, the impact of newness has not been evalu-
ated using other firm performance measures, and neither has there been any evaluation of
whether formal enterprises delaying registration suffer worse future firm performance
than those registered from the outset. Although studies by McKenzie and Sakho (2010) in
Bolivia and McCulloch, Schulze, and Voss (2010) in rural Indonesia evaluate the benefits
of registration, they do not consider the benefits of nonregistration. Neither has there been
any comparison of the firm performance of registered firms delaying registration at start
up with those registered from the outset. The exception is a study by Perry et al. (2007).
Analyzing World Bank survey data on 355 formal enterprises that delayed registration
across seven Latin American countries (104 in Colombia, 72 in Argentina, 72 in Bolivia,
66 in Mexico, 20 in Peru, 12 in Uruguay, and 9 in Panama), the finding is that they “at
least initially, exhibit on average, much lower levels of output per worker, after control-
ling for firm size, time in business, sector and region” (Perry et al., p. 173). However, this
is a small sample, the productivity gap is statistically significant in only four of the seven
countries, and the average national figure of 29% lower productivity for those delaying
registration is skewed by the Peru figure where the productivity gap is over 50%, which is
not statistically significant, and only 20 unregistered start ups were surveyed.
It is not only the weak evidence base that intimates a need to analyze this relationship
between delaying registration and firm performance. There are strong theoretical ration-
ales for doing so. For entrepreneurs to survive and grow, they must gain legitimacy (Scott,
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2008), which refers to “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an enti-
ty are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). From an institutional perspec-
tive, the conventional liabilities of newness view that nonregistered start ups lack legiti-
macy fails to recognize that although lacking legality in relation to the codified laws and
regulations of formal institutions, informal entrepreneurs are often socially legitimate in
relation to the norms, values, and beliefs that constitute the informal institutions (Siqueira
et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009) and thus have legitimacy with their stakeholders (e.g., con-
sumers, suppliers, and employees). This is especially so in developing countries where, as
discussed above, both formal institutional imperfections and/or institutional incongruence
are greater (Kistruck et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2013, 2014).
By achieving some level of legitimacy with their stakeholders without having to reg-
ister, enterprises that delay registering can at least initially avoid the formal institutional
costs of registration (e.g., paying direct and indirect taxes, burdensome regulations) and
the additional ancillary costs imposed on formal enterprises by corrupt public sector offi-
cials (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). Moreover, it can be argued that the
benefits of registration (e.g., access to credit, opportunities to engage with large firms and
procure government contracts, reduced harassment by officials, and access to broader
training and support programs) in developing countries might be insufficient to outweigh
the benefits of nonregistration, especially in the early stages. McKenzie and Sakho (2010)
in Bolivia and McCulloch, Schulze, and Voss (2010) in rural Indonesia find that registra-
tion only increases firm profitability and sales growth for mid-sized firms, suggesting that
delaying registration until firms reach a certain size may be optimal. Meanwhile,
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) find in Mexico that microbusinesses often view the
added value of registration as limited, not least because they are often run by individuals
waiting to enter salaried jobs or doing so to supplement the income from their formal job,
so for them, business expansion may not be a central motivation and registration is thus
irrelevant and potentially costly. Registration, therefore, can be portrayed as simply
another significant cost imposed by the formal institutional environment that comes with
little benefit in many developing countries. Initial nonregistration, in consequence, may
enable new ventures to outperform those registered from the outset since they have the
prerequisite of legitimacy but without suffering the costs of registration (Kistruck et al.,
2015; La Porta & Schleifer, 2014).
By avoiding this cost, those delaying registration may also lay a stronger foundation
by being able to focus their scarce resources on overcoming other internal and external
liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Internally, a new venture may lack operation-
al routines, as well as camaraderie, trust, and cohesion, resulting in significant competi-
tive (e.g., cost) disadvantages relative to more established competitors. Members must
therefore learn unfamiliar roles, which requires significant time and other resources and
in turn, may lead to internal inefficiencies and missed opportunities. Externally, new ven-
tures’ lack of a track record makes it difficult for them to convince potential stakeholders
(e.g., investors, customers, suppliers) to conduct business with them. Without these exter-
nal resources (e.g., capital, sales, raw materials) however, a new venture cannot survive.
By avoiding the costs of registration, resources can be potentially devoted to overcoming
these other liabilities of newness, thus enabling them to outperform those devoting resour-
ces to registration, which may reap few benefits in developing countries. It can be conse-
quently proposed that delaying registration may give new ventures a head start that
enables them to forge ahead of those registered from the outset in terms of firm
performance.
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Until now, nevertheless, with the exception of the small study by Perry et al. (2007)
discussed above, no studies have evaluated whether delaying registration until later
results in higher subsequent firm performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis can
be tested:
Hypothesis 1: Enterprises starting up unregistered and then registering display
higher subsequent levels of firm performance than those starting up registered.
Impacts of Length of Nonregistration on Firm Performance
Competing views also exist on how the length of time spent unregistered before regis-
tering influences future firm performance. From the conventional liabilities of newness
perspective that unregistered enterprises lack legality and are worse performing, increas-
ing the length of time spent lacking legality would further heighten the deleterious
impacts of nonregistration on future firm performance. Unable to grow and expand due to
their lack of legality, reliability, and accountability, and ability to be perceived as compe-
tent, effective, and worthy, the longer they remain unregistered the worse would be their
future firm performance relative to enterprises registered from the outset (Farrell, 2004;
Palmer, 2007).
However, from an institutional perspective that recognizes that nonregistration does
not automatically result in a lack of social legitimacy in the developing world, the longer
they spend unregistered, the higher might be their future firm performance. First, this is
because the longer they delay registration, the longer they avoid the high ongoing costs of
registration (e.g., burdensome regulations, paying direct and indirect taxes, and bribes to
corrupt public officials), and second, because they have longer to lay a stronger founda-
tion by focusing their resources on overcoming other liabilities of newness. This will be
particularly beneficial in contexts where “weak” formal institutions fail to provide suffi-
cient benefits to warrant formalization (Kistruck et al., 2015; Wunsch-Vincent, de Beer,
& Fu, 2015) and the costs of registration thus outweigh the benefits.
Although in the developed world, therefore, the point where the benefits of registra-
tion outweigh the costs of continuing unregistered may be quickly reached, this is less
likely and may be much longer in developing countries where entrepreneurs live in tran-
sient poverty (fluctuating between different degrees of poverty) and the costs of registra-
tion may lead to major financial difficulties (Hulme & Shepherd, 2003), while the weak
formal institutions result in fewer benefits from registration (De Mel, McKenzie, &
Woodruff, 2012; Thai & Turkina, 2014). As such, the following hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis 2: The longer start ups spend unregistered before registering, the
higher is their future firm performance.
Methods
Data and Variables
Data. To evaluate these hypotheses, WBES data is analyzed from 127 developing coun-
tries, including 41 in Africa, 13 in East Asia and the Pacific region, 29 in Europe and
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Central Asia, 31 in Latin America and Caribbean, 7 in the Middle East and North Africa,
and 6 in South Asia. Of these, 25 are low income countries, 42 lower middle income
countries, 36 middle income countries, 4 upper middle income countries, and 20 high
income countries. All world regions and development levels are thus covered.
In each country, the WBES collects data using a stratified random sample of nonagri-
cultural formal private sector businesses with five or more employees, which is stratified
by firm size, business sector, and geographic region. The firm size strata in the WBES are
5–19 (small), 20–99 (medium), and 1001 employees (large-sized firms), while sector is
broken down into manufacturing, services, transportation, and construction. Public utili-
ties, government services, health care, and financial service sectors are not included, and
in larger economies, manufacturing subsectors are selected as additional strata on the
basis of employment, value-added, and total number of establishments. Geographical
regions within a country are selected based on which cities/regions collectively contain
the majority of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of eli-
gible firms, normally obtained from the country’s statistical office or another government
agency such as the tax or business licensing authorities. Since 2006, all national surveys
explain the source of the sample frame. To deal with nonresponse, the sampling strategy
factors in a 25% nonresponse rate per stratum, so that there are sufficient valid responses
to compute performance indicators with the required precision level.
To collect data, a harmonized questionnaire is used across all countries, answered by
some 1200–1800 business owners and top managers in larger economies, 360 in medium-
sized economies and 150 in smaller economies. Although 135 countries are covered by
the WBES and data is available from 2002 to 2014, the sample here is restricted to the
127 countries that since 2006 have used the harmonized questionnaire and common meth-
odology, which assures that data is comparable across countries and over time.
Dependent Variables. To evaluate the relationship between delaying registration and
future firm performance, the dependent variables are the three key firm performance
measures on which the WBES collects data, namely: (1) Real annual sales growth (using
GDP deflators) (%): this is a derived variable in the WBES measuring the change in sales
reported in this fiscal year from a previous period. For most countries the difference
between the two fiscal year periods is 2 years. However, for some countries the interval
is 3 years. Hence, an annualized measure is used. All values for sales are converted to
USD using the exchange rate in the corresponding fiscal year of the survey. Sales are
deflated to 2009 using the USD deflator, (2) Annual employment growth (%): this is a
derived variable in the WBES measuring the annualized growth of permanent full-time
workers expressed as a percentage. Annual employment growth is the change in full-
time employment reported in the current fiscal year from a previous period. For most
countries the difference between the two fiscal year periods is 2 years. However, for
some countries the interval is 3 years. Hence, an annualized measure is used. And (3)
Annual productivity growth (%): this is a derived variable that measures annualized
growth in labor productivity where labor productivity is real sales (using GDP deflators)
divided by full-time permanent workers. Annual productivity growth is the change in
labor productivity reported in the current fiscal year from a previous period. For most
countries the interval is 2 years. However, for some countries it is 3 years. Hence, an
annualized measure is used.
Key Independent Variables. To evaluate the influence of these formal enterprises
starting up unregistered on future firm performance, two indicators are used: (1) Started
unregistered: A firm-level measure that examines responses to the question, “Was this
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establishment formally registered when it began operations?” This is a dummy variable
with value 1 indicating that the firm started operations in the country without formal regis-
tration and 0 when the firm was formally registered, and (2) Years unregistered: A contin-
uous variable counting the number of years the firm operated without formal registration.
This variable has value 0 for firms that were registered from the outset. It is computed by
analyzing the responses to three questions: “In what year did this establishment begin
operations?”, “Was this establishment formally registered when it began operations?”,
and “In what year was this establishment formally registered?”, The average number of
years operating without registration is computed only for firms stating they were not for-
mally registered when starting operations in the country.
Control Variables. To measure whether formal enterprises starting up and spending
varying amounts of time unregistered witness different levels of firm performance than
enterprises registered from the outset, it is necessary to control for other key determinants
of firm performance. Here, nine characteristics are controlled for which previous studies
reveal significantly influence firm performance, namely firm age, firm size, legal status,
ownership structure, sector, access to finance, the level of technological innovation,
human capital factors, and other business environment factors.
Firm age is controlled for since the long-standing liabilities of newness perspective,
as discussed, views nascent enterprises as poorer performing (Stinchcombe, 1965). Firm
age is a continuous variable for the number of years since the firm was established. Firm
size, meanwhile, is controlled for since larger firms perform better than smaller ones
(Hsieh & Olken, 2014; La Porta & Schleifer, 2014), not least due to the lower average
unit costs in larger firms. Firm size is a categorical variable with value 1 for small firms
with less than 20 employees, value 2 for medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees,
and value 3 for large firms with more than 100 employees.
Different types of ownership structure and legal status are also strongly correlated
with firm performance, including whether a firm is state-owned or privately owned, for-
eign- or domestic-owned and an open- or closed-shareholding, partnership, or sole propri-
etorship (Barbera & Moores, 2013; Baghdasaryan & la Cour, 2013). Given that
unregistered start ups may have different ownership structures and legal statuses than reg-
istered start ups, controlling for this is important. Here, legal status is a categorical vari-
able indicating whether the enterprise is an open- or closed-shareholding, a sole
proprietorship, a partnership, a limited partnership, or any other form. In addition, wheth-
er the organization is foreign- or domestic-owned is examined using a dummy variable
with value 1 indicating if the share of the firm’s ownership held by foreign individuals or
enterprises is larger than 49% and 0 otherwise. Given that export-oriented firms display
higher levels of firm performance (La Porta & Schleifer, 2008), export-orientation is also
included as a control using a dummy variable with value 1 for firms exporting directly at
least 1% of sales and 0 for those who sell only domestically.
Firm performance also varies across economic sectors (Nabar & Yan, 2013; Siqueira
et al., 2016). Given that those delaying registration may be concentrated in labor-intensive
sectors with fewer returns to scale (Perry et al., 2007), controlling for sector is important.
Sector is here a categorical variable indicating the sector of the firm (i.e., textiles, leather,
garments, food, metals and machinery, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wood
and furniture, nonmetallic and plastic materials, auto and auto components, other
manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, hotels and restaurants, and others).
Access to finance is strongly correlated with firm performance, and given a burgeon-
ing literature on how unregistered start ups lack access to finance from formal lenders,
this may well influence firm performance because they scale down operations and the
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high cost of informal loans and limited financing available lead them to substitute (low
skilled) labor for physical capital (Amaral & Quintin, 2006). Access to bank loans or
credit is a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has access to bank loans or to
a line of credit to finance its activities and 0 otherwise.
Firm performance is also often associated with the level of technological innova-
tion (Mansury & Love, 2008). Given the lower innovation and adoption of new tech-
nologies in informal enterprises, and that which does exist is more adaptation and
imitation (Wunsch-Vincent et al., 2015), controlling for this is important, especially
given that some view this as the key reason for the productivity gap between devel-
oped and developing economies (Farrell, 2004; Palmade, 2005). Here, three variables
available in the WBES are used: quality certification, a dummy variable with value 1
indicating the firm has an internationally recognized certification and 0 otherwise;
presence of a website, a dummy variable with value 1 when the firm uses a website
for business-related activities and 0 otherwise; and the use of e-mail, a dummy vari-
able with value 1 when a firm uses e-mail to interact with clients and suppliers and 0
otherwise.
Human capital factors, such as the educational level, skills, and experience of the
owners, managers, and the workforce; the level of professionalism; and whether there
is numerical flexibility in the workforce, impact on firm performance (Black & Lynch,
1996; Gennaiolo, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2013; La Porta & Schleifer,
2014; Van der Sluis, Van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2005). Controlling for human capital
factors is thus important, especially given that informality is associated with less pro-
ductive workers due to more productive workers self-selecting formal over informal
enterprises (Amaral & Quintin, 2006). Here, six control variables in the WBES are
used: top manager’s experience, a continuous variable of the years of experience the
top manager has in the sector; temporary workers, a variable measuring the average
number of temporary workers in the firm; permanent full-time workers, a continuous
variable of the average number of permanent full-time workers in the firm; female full-
time workers, examining the share of permanent full-time workers that are female;
female involvement in ownership, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating whether
women are involved in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise; and as a signal of
professionalism, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has its annual finan-
cial statement reviewed by an external auditor and 0 otherwise.
So too does the wider business environment determine firm performance. To control
for this, two variables are used, namely: transport, a dummy variable with value 1 indicat-
ing that transportation is a major constraint for the firm’s activity and 0 otherwise, and
electricity, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating that electricity supply is a major
constraint for the firm’s activity and 0 otherwise.
Multiple Imputation of Missing Values. The method of multiple imputation of missing
values is used to solve the missing data problem in survey data. Its objective is to substi-
tute the missing values with the values computed using the observed variables. As cross-
country datasets like WBES suffer from missing information, this is addressed by apply-
ing multiple imputation methods (through a system of chained equations) to the sample
used in the estimation. In this dataset, the average number of imputed missing values
across variables with missing information is 6,611 (with a maximum of 30,122 and a min-
imum of 231). Based on the classical methodological literature on multiple imputations
(Collins, Schafer, & Kam, 2001; Rubin, 1987; Schafer & Graham, 2002), 10 imputations
are used. This increases the reliability of the imputed dataset compared with the original
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one. However, we also here conduct analysis without imputation to demonstrate the
robustness of the findings.
Multilevel Modeling. To evaluate the impact of delaying registration on firm perfor-
mance across the 127 countries in the WBES for the period 2006 to 2014, we apply multi-
level techniques. Given that the surveyed enterprises in the WBES are clustered across
country-year subsamples, multilevel modelling is the optimal technique to elicit unbiased
standard errors as well as reliable statistical comparisons. In the standard regression model,
a single random residual adjusts the prediction to the observed value for each individual
observation.
yi5b01b1x11   1bnxn1ei (1)
In contrast, the random intercept model decomposes the residual into two random terms,
one for the individual and the other for the aggregate level (Snijders & Bosker, 2012):
yij5c001u0j1eij (2)
where eij remains the individual-level (in our case firm-level) error term and c00 the average
intercept for all countries. Here, the constant term (b0j) is the result of two separate compo-
nents; u0j is the random noise correcting the average intercept to each country observation.
This second random term is a type of latent variable capturing the specificity of each cluster
that can eventually be explained by modelling the variation existing within and across clus-
ters under a full model specification. The decomposition of the regression error into u0j and
eij allows for a proper quantification of the effect of the clustering of individual observations
and a reliable estimation of the effect of the individual variables (that can be placed at either
Level 1, Level 2, or both). Random effects can be added to the slope of individual-level
independent variables. This relaxes the assumption that the effect of a given predictor is
equal across aggregate level units of analysis. In this case, the slope of a given predictor b1j
is decomposed into an average impact (c10Þ and a group-specific one (uijÞ. The complete
model specification is thus the following:
yij5c001u0j1y10x1j1u1j1   1bnxn1eij (3)
Here, we use random slope and random constant models to estimate the average
impact of delaying registration on firm performance across countries and years unreg-
istered, accounting for how the size of informal economy and years unregistered
varies between countries (La Porta & Schleifer, 2014; Schneider & Williams, 2013).
The number of countries analyzed is not drawn from a random sample to infer regu-
larities in the broader population, but represents the universe, namely 127 countries.
This means that we do not need to treat combinations of country-years as the Level 2
units but that the average effect of years unregistered can be estimated. That is, our
Level 2 only considers the clustering of firms at the country level while, as mentioned
above, the multilevel regressions include year dummies to control for time fixed
effects at the firm level. Finally, as is customary in multilevel modeling, to interpret
the results we center all control variables around each country at the aggregate level
(group mean centering). While centering independent variables is advisable in random
intercept models to interpret the average constant in the model, it is of key impor-
tance in the random slopes models used here to give a substantive interpretation to
the intercept and the random components of the constant (Cebolla, 2013). The only
explanatory variables not centered around the group mean are the two indicators of
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informal entrepreneurship, as in both cases the value 0 has a substantive interpretation
for this article (started business registered in one case, and spent 0 years unregistered
in the other).
Sample Selection Bias Correction: The Heckman Method
Using imputed data and the multilevel modelling framework, but without account-
ing for sample selection bias, any findings for hypothesis 2 may conflate the effect of
being unregistered at start up with the effect of years spent unregistered. To address
this, we apply Heckman’s two-step estimator on the nonimputed dataset by estimating
a first-stage model that predicts the likelihood of registration at start up and including
the correction factor in the second-stage model that predicts firm performance. Regis-
tration is an endogenous choice of firms. As such, the sample of firms available for
analysis cannot be taken as random. Rather, the sample is a sample of firms with a
systematic pattern of registration. In the Heckman selection model, firm performance
can be modeled, controlling for this sample selection bias problem.
The Heckman two-stage modeling helps address the endogeneity issue (i.e., unob-
served heterogeneity between registered and unregistered firms) but does not necessarily
remove the need to control for the main effect of “started unregistered” when estimating
the impact of “years unregistered.” Therefore, in all three regression equations (i.e., sales,
employment, and productivity), we account for the “started unregistered” status of the
firms under consideration.
With regard to the identification strategy, we argue that institutional circumstances
are critical in affecting the endogenous decision of firms to register or not. In the WBES
data, a variable captures the level of trust and confidence that firms have in government/
public institutions such as the courts and dealing with regulatory bodies. After defining a
binary variable which assumes a value of 1 if firms have trust and confidence in the impar-
tiality or fairness of public institutions that they deal with and a value of 0 otherwise, we
include it in the first stage and exclude it in the primary equation (i.e., the second-stage
sales, employment, and productivity equations) for identification. We believe that this
trust and confidence variable affects the registration decision but not performance direct-
ly. In other words, trust is indicative of the confidence of entrepreneurs while interacting
with public officials, which is potentially one of the significant factors affecting firms’
registration status but unlikely to affect annual growth rate of sales, employment, and pro-
ductivity of firms directly.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the dependent and key explanatory
variables are provided in Table 1. The correlation statistics suggest no problem of
multicollinearity.
Of the 95,522 formal private sector businesses with five or more employees surveyed
in the WBES between 2006 and 2014 across 127 developing economies, 10.2% had not
been registered at the commencement of operations. To analyze whether delaying regis-
tration and the length of time they remained unregistered impacts subsequent firm perfor-
mance, when other key firm-level determinants of firm performance are introduced and
held constant (e.g., firm size, firm age, technology, and sector across countries), Table 2
reports the results of the random intercept and random slopes multilevel models for the
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three measures of firm performance. The random intercept specification to recall, takes
into account country-level specific differences on firm performance whereas the introduc-
tion of random slopes for the key independent variables allows for the varying impact of
these determinants on firm performance due to country-specific differences.1
Evaluating hypothesis 1 regarding whether formal enterprises starting up unregistered
display higher levels of firm performance than those starting up registered, model 1 in
Table 2 reveals that once other firm-level determinants of firm performance are controlled
for, formal enterprises that started up unregistered have an annual average sales growth
rate 1.4 percentage points greater (i.e., 8.6% compared with 7.2%) and thus 19.4% higher
than firms starting up registered, model 2 that they have an annual average employment
growth rate 1.7 percentage points greater (i.e., 6.6% compared with 4.9%) and thus
34.7% higher than enterprises starting up registered, and model 3 that starting up unregis-
tered has no significant deleterious impact on their annual productivity growth rate, which
is 0.09 percentage points lower than those registered from the outset. For these formal
enterprises, delaying registration thus resulted in a significant boost to their average annual
sales and employment growth rates, and did not affect annual productivity growth
rates.
Models 4 to 6 in Table 2, meanwhile, evaluate whether the longer formal enterprises
spend unregistered before registering, the higher is their future firm performance. These
partially confirm H2. For each year a firm remains unregistered before registering, annual
sales growth rates are 0.15 percentage points higher (in model 4) and annual employment
growth rates are 0.18 percentage points higher (in model 5) than for firms that started-up
registered. As model 6 shows however, there is no such significant premium from remain-
ing unregistered for longer for annual productivity growth rates.
These findings in Table 2 on the relationship between length of nonregistration and
firm performance, however, may conflate the effects of being unregistered at start up with
the effect of years spent unregistered. To control for sample selection bias and in order to
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Dependent and Key Explanatory
Variables (Combined Multiple Imputation Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
After 10 Imputations)
Variables Mean Min Max SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Sales 7.47 2100 100 29.70 1
2 Employment 5.45 2100 100 17.37 0.20* 1
3 Productivity 2.58 2100 100 31.42 0.85* 20.32* 1
4 Started unregistered 0.10 0 1 0.30 20.01* 0.03* 20.02* 1
5 Years unregistered 0.88 0 195 5.07 20.01* 20.02* 0.00* 0.36* 1
*p< .01 (N5 95,522)
Source: WBES 2006-2014 data set; own calculations.
1. The intraclass correlation parameter estimated across the models (between 12 and 21%) suggests that
country-level characteristics play an important role in firm performance. The introduction of random inter-
cepts and random slope in our multilevel specifications aims to partially account for these differences.
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Table 2
Linear Multilevel Regression for the Impact of Informal Entrepreneurship on
Firm Performance (Combined Multiple Imputation Results After 10
Imputations)
Sales Employment Productivity Sales Employment Productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Informal
entrepreneurship
Started
unregistered
1.41*** (0.49) 1.76*** (0.28) 20.09 (0.47)
Years unregistered 0.15*** (0.05) 0.18*** (0.02) 20.01 (0.05)
Firm age 20.28***(0.02) 20.31*** (0.01) 20.00 (0.02) 20.28*** (0.02) 20.32*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Exporter 20.18 (0.18) 20.04 (0.06) 20.13 (0.19) 20.20 (0.19) 20.04 (0.06) 20.15 (0.19)
Foreign ownership 0.06 (0.12) 0.02 (0.04) 0.07 (0.12) 0.08 (0.12) 0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.12)
Workforce
Top manager’s
experience
20.04*** (0.01) 20.06*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 20.04*** (0.01) 20.06*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Temporary
workers
0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Permanent full-
time workers
0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Female full-time
workers
20.01*** (0.00) 20.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 20.01*** (0.00) 20.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01)
Female participa-
tion ownership
0.05 (0.07) 0.00 (0.02) 0.07 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 20.01 (0.02) 0.07 (0.07)
Bank loan/credit 20.11 (0.08) 0.03 (0.03) 20.15* (0.08) 20.11 (0.08) 0.03 (0.03) 20.14* (0.08)
Major constraints
Transport 0.03 (0.10) 0.07** (0.04) 20.03 (0.11) 0.02 (0.10) 0.08*** (0.03) 20.04 (0.11)
Electricity 20.10* (0.06) 20.02 (0.02) 20.08 (0.06) 20.09 (0.06) 20.03 (0.02) 20.06 (0.06)
Innovation &
technology
Quality
certification
20.06 (0.11) 20.01 (0.04) 20.06 (0.12) 20.07 (0.11) 20.00 (0.04) 20.07 (0.12)
External auditor 0.01 (0.05) 20.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.06)
Website 0.17 (0.11) 0.02 (0.04) 0.15 (0.12) 0.17 (0.11) 0.03 (0.04) 0.15 (0.12)
E-mail 20.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.03) 20.03 (0.11) 20.03 (0.10) 0.00 (0.03) 20.03 (0.11)
Firm size (R.C.:
Small)
Medium 20.10 (0.17) 20.03 (0.06) 20.08 (0.18) 20.10 (0.17) 20.02 (0.05) 20.08 (0.18)
Large 0.06 (0.17) 20.01 (0.06) 0.06 (0.17) 0.06 (0.17) 20.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.18)
Legal status (R.C.:
Open
shareholding)
Closed
shareholding
20.01 (0.19) 0.14** (0.06) 20.16 (0.20) 20.05 (0.19) 0.11* (0.06) 20.16 (0.20)
Sole
proprietorship
20.03 (0.19) 0.16** (0.06) 20.20 (0.20) 20.06 (0.19) 0.14** (0.06) 20.21 (0.20)
Partnership 20.17 (0.20) 0.15** (0.07) 20.31 (0.20) 20.21 (0.20) 0.12* (0.06) 20.32 (0.21)
Limited
partnership
0.03 (0.19) 0.12* (0.06) 20.11 (0.20) 20.02 (0.19) 0.08 (0.06) 20.12 (0.20)
Other form 20.60** (0.27) 0.06 (0.09) 20.68** (0.28) 20.65** (0.27) 0.03 (0.08) 20.70** (0.28)
Industry Sector
(R.C.: Textile)
Leather 20.00 (0.23) 0.06 (0.084) 20.09 (0.25) 20.01 (0.24) 0.07 (0.08) 20.09 (0.25)
Garments 0.41 (0.26) 0.04 (0.09) 0.34 (0.27) 0.41 (0.26) 0.04 (0.08) 0.34 (0.27)
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check the robustness of our findings, therefore, Table 3 reports the results of Heckman-
based two-step estimations using the nonimputed dataset and a truncated sample that
examines only firms that have been established in the last 45 years (given the difficulty of
owners knowing whether or not a business started up unregistered or not beyond this time
period). The results are similar to the ones we obtain if the overall sample is not truncat-
ed,2 pointing to the robustness of our results.
Table 2
Continued
Sales Employment Productivity Sales Employment Productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Food 20.14 (0.25) 20.06 (0.09) 20.04 (0.26) 20.15 (0.25) 20.08 (0.08) 20.03 (0.26)
Metals and
machinery
0.33 (0.29) 0.12 (0.10) 0.26 (0.31) 0.38 (0.30) 0.08 (0.09) 0.31 (0.31)
Electronics 0.79 (0.76) 0.18 (0.25) 0.68 (0.80) 0.69 (0.77) 0.17 (0.23) 0.60 (0.80)
Chemicals,
pharmaceutical
20.17 (0.55) 0.14 (0.18) 20.28 (0.57) 20.10 (0.55) 0.22 (0.17) 20.28 (0.57)
Wood, furniture 20.03 (0.34) 0.23** (0.11) 20.26 (0.35) 20.06 (0.34) 0.22** (0.11) 20.28 (0.36)
Nonmetallic, plas-
tic materials
21.44*** (0.37) 20.23* (0.13) 21.29*** (0.39) 21.41*** (0.38) 20.19 (0.12) 21.29*** (0.38)
Auto, auto
components
2.03 (1.25) 0.44 (0.42) 1.59 (1.32) 2.03 (1.26) 0.57 (0.39) 1.50 (1.31)
Other
manufacturing
20.02 (0.23) 0.04 (0.08) 20.05 (0.24) 20.02 (0.23) 0.02 (0.07) 20.04 (0.24)
Retail and whole-
sale trade
20.03 (0.18) 20.01 (0.06) 20.01 (0.19) 20.02 (0.18) 20.01 (0.06) 20.01 (0.19)
Hotels and
restaurants
20.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.10) 220.21 (0.30) 20.13 (0.29) 0.12 (0.09) 20.24 (0.30)
Other services 0.19 (0.22) 0.08 (0.07) 0.11 (0.23) 0.18 (0.22) 0.06 (0.07) 0.12 (0.23)
Other unclassified 20.22 (0.21) 0.17** (0.07) 20.39* (0.22) 20.21 (0.21) 0.17** (0.07) 20.38* (0.22)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant (fixed) 11.24***(0.90) 9.60***(0.30) 2.66***(0.95) 11.41***(0.92) 9.82*** (0.29) 2.63*** (0.96)
Random
disturbance
Constant 7.36 2.32 7.73 7.34 2.21 7.86
Slope: Started
unregistered
2.01 1.46 1.90
Slope: Years
unregistered
2.11 1.23 1.34
ICC (%) 21 12 21 21 12 21
Observations 95,522 95,522 95,522 95,522 95,522 95,522
Countries 127 127 127 127 127 127
Model F test 12.44 37.34 2.83 11.95 60.51 3.24
Prob>F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Significant at *p< .1; ** p< .05; and *** p< .01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: WBES 20062 2014; own calculations.
2. Results based on the overall sample without truncation can be obtained from authors upon request.
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Table 3
Heckman Two-Step Estimator for the Impact of Years Spent Unregistered and
Unregistered Status at Start Up on Firm Performance (Second Stage or Primary
Equation Estimates With Sample Selection Bias Correction and Truncated
Sample)
Sales Employment Productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Years spent unregistered 0.09** (0.05) 0.11** (0.02) 0.10** (0.05)
Started unregistered 1.05**(0.55) 1.56***(0.20) 1.62***(0.31)
Firm age 20.17*** (0.01) 20.17*** (0.01) 20.01 (0.01)
Exporter 20.00 (0.00) 20.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Foreign ownership 20.00 (0.45) 21.05*** (0.26) 1.07** (0.47)
Workforce
Top manager’s experience 0.03*** (0.01) 20.06*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
Temporary workers 0.01 (0.01) 0.01** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Permanent full-time workers 0.00 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 20.00** (0.00)
Female full-time workers 0.00 (0.00) 20.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
Female participation ownership 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Bank loan/credit 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Major constraints
Transport 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 20.00 (0.00)
Electricity 20.01*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 20.02*** (0.00)
Innovation & technology
Quality certification 0.02*** (0.00) 20.00 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
External auditor 20.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Website 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 20.00 (0.00)
E-mail 0.01** (0.00) 0.015*** (0.00) 20.00 (0.00)
Firm size (R.C.: Small)
Medium 1.69*** (0.31) 2.88*** (0.17) 20.93*** (0.32)
Large 2.20*** (0.48) 3.90*** (0.28) 21.53*** (0.50)
Legal status (R.C.: Open
shareholding)
Closed shareholding 1.82*** (0.60) 2.08*** (0.34) 20.24 (0.62)
Sole proprietorship 1.04* (0.65) 3.98*** (0.36) 22.78*** (0.67)
Partnership 1.79** (0.79) 2.86*** (0.44) 21.21 (0.81)
Limited partnership 0.22 (0.75) 2.24*** (0.42) 22.78*** (0.77)
Other form 3.19*** (1.07) 3.16*** (0.60) 0.47 (1.10)
Industry Sector (R.C.: Textile)
Leather 11.88*** (1.78) 3.37*** (0.99) 9.11*** (1.85)
Garments 20.16 (0.71) 20.29 (0.41) 20.13 (0.73)
Food 0.45 (0.66) 0.58* (0.38) 20.19 (0.68)
Metals and machinery 1.08 (0.70) 20.40 (0.41) 1.47** (0.71)
Electronics 20.78 (1.18) 21.92*** (0.68) 1.17 (1.21)
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 0.67 (0.77) 1.74*** (0.45) 21.08 (0.78)
Wood, furniture 22.01** (1.01) 20.25 (0.58) 21.06 (1.04)
Nonmetallic, plastic materials 22.47*** (0.74) 21.08** (0.43) 21.49** (0.77)
Auto, auto components 0.19 (1.71) 1.25 (0.99) 20.64 (1.74)
Other manufacturing 20.01 (0.68) 20.95** (0.39) 0.45 (0.70)
Retail and wholesale trade 1.07* (0.62) 2.18*** (0.35) 21.19* (0.64)
Hotels and restaurants 20.83 (0.84) 0.26 (0.47) 21.09 (0.87)
Other services 1.88** (0.72) 0.80** (0.41) 1.11 (0.74)
Other unclassified 2.41*** (0.80) 0.11 (0.46) 2.39*** (0.82)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Constant 7.91*** (1.20) 4.67*** (0.59) 2.87*** (1.27)
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Analyzing this truncated sample, and once other firm-level determinants of firm per-
formance are controlled for, model 1 reveals that formal enterprises which started up
unregistered have an annual average sales growth rate 1.05 percentage points greater
(i.e., 8.3% compared with 7.25%) and thus 14.5% higher than firms starting up regis-
tered, model 2 that they have an annual average employment growth rate 1.56 percent-
age points greater (i.e., 6.5% compared with 4.94%) and thus 31.6% higher than
enterprises starting up registered, and model 3 that they have an annual average produc-
tivity rate 1.62 percentage points higher (i.e., 3.9% compared with 2.28%) and thus
71% higher than enterprises registered from the outset. These findings thus support
hypothesis 1. For each year a firm remains unregistered at start up, moreover, annual
sales growth rates are 0.09 percentage points higher (in model 1), annual employment
growth rates are 0.11 percentage points higher (in model 2), and annual productivity
growth rates are 0.10 percentage points higher (in model 3) than for firms that started
up registered, with the average firm remaining unregistered for 0.88 years. These results
thus support hypothesis 2. The findings of the multivariate analysis based on the Heck-
man method with the truncated sample (Table 3) are thus consistent with the findings
from the multilevel model (Table 2). Enterprises that spend longer unregistered outper-
form enterprises registered from the outset, with or without sample selection bias correc-
tion, as well as with or without imputation of the data, and whether or not the sample is
truncated, pointing to the robustness of the parameter estimates.
Further robustness tests have checked whether the results are sensitive to potential
outlying observations of our independent variables and also the three performance indica-
tors (the dependent variables). These tests analyzed the kernel density of our dependent
variables to evaluate the appropriateness of the normal distributional assumption underly-
ing our estimation techniques and to identify the presence of any outliers. For the inde-
pendent variables, we trimmed the top 1% (highest) and the bottom 1% (lowest)
observations. The results of doing so had no effect on the sign and statistical significance
of the estimates. For instance, the respective annual sales, employment, and productivity
growth rates are 0.09, 0.11, and 0.10 percentage points higher for each year of
Table 3
Continued
Sales Employment Productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lambda 0.16 6.32*** 20.01
S.E. of Lambda (0.99) (0.48) (1.09)
Observations 60,693 60,367 60,755
Countries 127 127 127
Model Wald Chi-square statistic 2624.3*** 2301.5*** 2244.7***
p-value of Wald .000 .000 .000
Significant at *p< .1; ** p< .05; and *** p< .01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: WBES 2006–2014; own calculations.
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nonregistration, compared well with the respective figures of 0.10, 0.10, and 0.08 percent-
age points higher when the sample excluded the outlying observations.3
Discussion
This analysis of WBES data from 127 countries reveals that 1 in 10 (10.2%) of the
formal private sector businesses with five employees or more surveyed started up unregis-
tered. These formal enterprises delaying registration subsequently outperformed those
which started up registered, witnessing 14.5% higher average annual sales growth (i.e.,
8.3% compared with 7.25%), 31.6% higher annual employment growth (i.e., 6.5% com-
pared with 4.94%), and 71% higher annual productivity growth (i.e., 3.9% compared with
2.28%). Moreover, the longer they delayed registration, the significantly better are their
annual sales, employment, and productivity growth rates, namely 0.09, 0.11, and 0.10
percentage points higher, respectively, for each year of nonregistration. Both hypotheses
1 and 2 are therefore supported.
These findings have important theoretical implications. Conventionally, registration
has been viewed as enhancing legitimacy and reducing liabilities of newness (Bitektine,
2011; Suchman, 1995). This study reveals the need to rethink this relationship in develop-
ing countries. Institutional theory recognizes that when incongruence exists between for-
mal and informal institutions, social legitimacy with stakeholders (e.g., consumers,
suppliers, and employees) can be achieved without registration, and this study has shown
that by delaying registration, enterprises appear to lay a stronger foundation for subse-
quent growth, perhaps due to being able to focus their resources on overcoming other lia-
bilities of newness. These include the internal development of stronger operational
routines, as well as camaraderie, trust, and cohesion, which reduces inefficiencies, as well
as the external development of market acceptance and stable links with stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, customers, and investors), thus, enabling them to outperform those who devote
resources to registration.
However, this is here propounded to be only the case with those enterprises who
reduce their external liabilities of newness by establishing market acceptance and stable
links with stakeholders (suppliers, investors, and/or customers) that are retained when
they register. No advantages will be gained by delaying registration with regard to exter-
nal liabilities of newness if the external networks are not relevant when they cross
institutional boundaries and register. If enterprises delaying registration serve discrete
and separate “bottom of the pyramid” markets with low-quality products using little capi-
tal (La Porta & Schleifer, 2014), then the external customer segments and broader rela-
tionships with suppliers and investors are unlikely to be transferable if they register.
Indeed, it is precisely these unregistered enterprises operating in separate markets which
find the costs of registration in terms of searching for and switching to a new network too
costly (Demenet et al., 2015; Lyon, 2000; Rivera-Santos & Rufin, 2010; Webb et al.,
2009), particularly with regard to suppliers and investors (Skousen & Mahoney, 2015),
which perhaps helps explain the low proportion of unregistered enterprises transitioning
to registration in developing economies (La Porta & Schleifer).
However, the outperformance of these enterprises delaying registration may not only
be because they are able to devote resources to overcoming some of their other internal
and external liabilities of newness, but also because the formal institutional imperfections
3. The detailed results of these sensitivity/robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
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in the developing world mean that the benefits of registration are insufficient to enable
those registered from the outset to outweigh the benefits achieved by delaying registration
(Scott & Haskei, 2015). Possible benefits of registration might include access to credit
markets, property rights, training from formal institutions (for which informal institutions
cannot act as an efficient substitute), belonging to business associations, contracts with
large firms, and the ability to become more capital-intensive (Fajnzylber et al., 2011;
Skousen &Mahoney, 2015). In many developing countries, however, registration appears
from the results of this study to provide additional costs but insufficient benefits to out-
weigh the benefits gained by delaying registration. In future research, evaluation is thus
required of whether the significant outperformance of those delaying registration is most-
ly due to them being able to devote more resources to overcoming other external and
internal liabilities of newness, or largely due to the benefits of registration being insuffi-
cient to compensate those registering from the outset, as well as how the weight accorded
to these factors varies across different developing economy contexts.
This has important policy implications. Given that the prevalence of unregistered
enterprises in developing economies has a deleterious impact on economic development
and growth (La Porta & Schleifer, 2014), governments have encouraged registration and
formalization. To achieve this, the conventional policy approach, drawing on the Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972) rational economic actor model, has been to change the cost/ben-
efit ratio regarding the costs of operating unregistered and benefits of registration,
predominantly by increasing the penalties, and perceived and actual risks of detection
(e.g., by increasing inspections) so as to increase the costs of operating unregistered.
Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, however, this deals only with the effects
of nonregistration, rather than the formal institutional imperfections and institutional
incongruence that lead enterprises to operate unregistered, and disadvantage those regis-
tering from the outset.
To tackle the formal institutional imperfections, two changes are required in develop-
ing countries. Conversely, the cost/benefit ratio of registration needs to be improved to
outweigh the cost/benefit ratio of nonregistration. First, this requires a simplification and
reduction in the costs of registration, which studies in Kenya (Devas & Kelly, 2001),
Uganda (Sander, 2003), Bolivia (Garcia-Bolivar, 2006), and Peru (Jaramillo, 2009) reveal
lead to an increase in registration. Second, the benefits of registration need to be
enhanced, although De Mel et al. (2012) in Sri Lanka find that even a financial offer
equivalent to 2 months’ profits led to only 50% of firms registering. This is perhaps
because the mistrust in governments and fear of the high recurrent costs of registration
need to be addressed (Maloney, 2004; McKenzie &Woodruff, 2006), along with the pro-
vision of higher levels of property rights protection (Marcoullier & Young, 1995; Nwabu-
zor, 2005; Thomas & Mueller, 2000), and improvements in the quality of governance,
decreases in public sector corruption, and increases in the level of government interven-
tion, such as social protection, which have been shown to reduce nonregistration and
informality (Autio & Fu, 2015; Dau & Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Klapper, Amit, Guillen,
& Quesdada, 2007; Thai & Turkina, 2014).
Conversely, improvements in formal institutions in terms of tax fairness, redistribu-
tive justice, and procedural justice are also required. Fairness here refers to the extent to
which entrepreneurs believe they are paying their fair share compared with others
(Wenzel, 2004), redistributive justice to whether they receive the goods and services they
feel that they deserve given the taxes they pay (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001) and proce-
dural justice to the degree to which they believe that the tax authority has treated them in
a respectful, impartial, and responsible manner (Braithwaite & Reinhart, 2000; Murphy,
2005).
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Besides improvements in the formal institutional environment, measures are also
required to alter the social legitimacy of operating unregistered so as to reduce institution-
al incongruence (and thus nonregistration). Once formal institutional improvements are
in situ, this can be achieved by governments using advertising campaigns regarding the
benefits of registration and costs of nonregistration, and providing information on the
public goods and services they will receive from registration and formalization (Saeed &
Shah, 2011).
These policy measures to improve formal institutions and reduce institutional incon-
gruence should not perhaps be seen as a substitute for the conventional policy approach
of increasing the costs of nonregistration by raising the perceived or actual risk of detec-
tion and/or penalties for nonregistration. Indeed, there are at least two ways of combining
them. First, a “responsive regulation” approach starts out by facilitating entrepreneurs to
self-regulate themselves in a manner consistent with the law (e.g., by reducing formal
institutional imperfections and institutional incongruence). This facilitating of voluntary
compliance is then followed by persuasion through enhancing the benefits of registration,
and only as a last resort for the small minority still refusing to be compliant does it use
punitive measures based on increasing the costs of nonregistration (Braithwaite, 2009;
Job, Stout, & Smith, 2007). A second approach is the “slippery slope framework”
(Kirchler, Hoelzl, &Wahl, 2008), which pursues both voluntary and enforced compliance
concurrently by developing both greater trust in authorities (e.g., by reducing formal insti-
tutional imperfections and institutional incongruence) and the greater power of authorities
by improving the benefits of registration and costs of nonregistration (Kogler, Muel-
bacher, & Kirchler, 2015; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Wahl, Kas-
tlunger, & Kirchler, 2010). Until now however, there has been no comparative evaluation
of which sequencing and/or combination of measures is the most appropriate and/or
effective means of fostering registration in different contexts.
Limitations and Future Research
Although formal enterprises delaying registration and spending longer unregistered
are shown to significantly outperform those registered from the outset of operations, there
are nevertheless limitations to what can be concluded and caveats required. First, how the
WBES measures both registration and firm performance could be considerably improved
in future research. When measuring registration, the WBES simply asks “Was this estab-
lishment formally registered when it began operations?” Only if the respondent asks does
the interviewer explain that this means registered with the most important institution for
tax purposes (defined on a country by country basis). However, respondents may interpret
registration in multifarious ways (e.g., possessing a local trading license, being registered
under factories’ or commercial acts, registered under professional groups’ regulatory
acts). The firm performance indicators analyzed in WBES, meanwhile, are also limited.
Not only are there known difficulties with estimating the sales of the self-employed
(Moock, Musgrove, & Stelcner, 1990; Vijverberg, 1995), but employment growth is only
measured per full-time worker, rather than full-time equivalent worker, as is productivity,
and solely labor productivity measured rather than total factor productivity, which would
account for sources of productivity beyond labor, such as management quality, technolog-
ical progress, and systems of government.
Neither has this analysis been able to identify either the reasons entrepreneurs initially
operate unregistered (e.g., whether they are simply awaiting registration, deliberately test-
trading on an unregistered basis to determine the venture’s viability before registering, or
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have no initial intention of registering) or the reasons enterprises register (e.g., better access
to financing or markets, fewer bribes, better opportunities with formal firms, more access to
government programs). Hence, analyzing whether different reasons for both being initially
unregistered as well as registering influence subsequent firm performance is not possible.
Future research needs to do this, both to explain the registration decision as well as to tailor
policy measures. Nor does this dataset allow an examination of whether registered enter-
prises that delay registration outperform those registered from the outset in advanced econ-
omies, and thus whether a retheorization of liabilities of newness is also required in the
rather different institutional environment of developed countries.
In sum, formal enterprises delaying registration and spending longer unregistered out-
perform those starting up registered, calling into question in the developing world the
view that nonregistration leads to a lack of legitimacy, which acts as a liability of new-
ness. If this now stimulates wider research on how the different reasons for being both ini-
tially unregistered and registering influence subsequent firm performance, as well as
whether it is similarly the case in developed countries that enterprises initially avoiding
the cost of firm registration, and focusing their resources on overcoming other liabilities
of newness, lay a stronger foundation for subsequent growth, then one of its intentions
will have been fulfilled. If this then leads to questions being raised about what policy
approaches should be pursued toward nonregistration, this article will have achieved its
fuller intention. What is certain, however, is that the currently dominant view of starting
up unregistered as reducing legitimacy and representing a liability of newness has little or
no evidence base in the developing world, and a policy approach of increasing the costs
of nonregistration deals largely with the effects rather than causes, and should henceforth
be complemented with measures to reduce formal institutional imperfections and institu-
tional incongruence.
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